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We build a model of an IPO for firms with private information about their 
earnings profile over time and test the model’s predictions using a complete 
sample of newly listed Chinese companies between 1992 and 2007. The model 
predicts that IPO size is positively correlated with short-term operating 
performance that is not directly consistent with traditional theories. It also 
provides an explanation for negative correlation between debt and profitability 
that is not consistent with standard trade-off theory or signaling theory. The 
empirical results provide strong support for our model. 
 
 Our model builds on pecking order, signaling and market timing theories of capital structure. 
In the model, we assume that managers representing initial shareholders raise capital for an 
investment project and where these managers may have private information about short-term as 
well as long-term earnings. Consider a firm that considers equity financing for a two-period 
investment project with cost Ct   in period t=1,2 . In each period the project may be successful or 
unsuccessful. In the latter case the cash flow equals 1  and in the former case the cash flow equals 0 
. A firm’s insiders have private information about the probability of success in each stage. The firms 
are of two types, type a  and type b, with respective probabilities of success θat  and θbt  in stage t. 
We show that a separating equilibrium where type a issues more equity exists if θa1 > θb1  and θa2 < 
θb2 which means that firm issuing equity has higher probability of success in period 1 and lower 
probability of success in period 2. 
  
Thus our model suggests a new motive for increasing IPO size that has not been explored in 
existing literature. When the firm knows that it will be high-profitable in the near future and low-
profitable in the long-term, it may want to issue more equity. This is contrary to standard approach 
under asymmetric information when the horizon of insiders private information is short-term or 
investment is one-stage. In that case IPO size is negatively correlated with short-term performance. 
When investment is two-stage and information is long-term then two types of behavior may emerge, 
one consistent and one inconsistent with standard approach. 
 
The Model 
Asymmetric Information and IPO Size of  
Newly Listed Chinese Companies 
We obtain the universe of Chinese domestic A-share IPOs made from the start of 1992 to the end 
of 2007, from GTA’s IPO database. The sample contains a total of 1,571 newly listed Chinese firms. 
The table below displays the number of IPOs by year and some summary statistics. The average offer 
price is yuan 8.0 ( roughly one US dollar). The first-day return, calculated as the percentage 
difference between the first-day close price and the offer price, is 227.4%, meaning that Chinese IPOs 
are substantially underpriced. The gross proceeds from the IPO, on average, is yuan 705.1 million. 
The average number of employees at the time of the IPO is slightly over 2,000. It is well known that 
many of the IPO firms are state owned enterprises being privatized. State ownership before and after 
the IPO is, on average, 55.1% and 39.5%, respectively.  
Data and Summary Statistics 
Operating Performance 
In Panel B, we report the year over year percentage changes in operating performance. 
In calculating percentage changes, we exclude those that have negative or zero starting 
values, as their results are meaningless. The results are similar. EBIT, for instance, increases 
at an annual rate of around 20% in the three years leading up to the IPO, but its growth rate 
drops to 10.7%, 1.1%, and 3.0% in the subsequent three years.  
The key prediction of our model of new issues under asymmetric information 
is that firms will sell more new shares when they expect higher short-term 
earnings or lower long-term earnings. To test this prediction, we run the 
following regression: 
 
Relative Offer Size = α + β1 * EBIT_0Y1  + β2  *EBIT_1Y2 + β3 *EBIT_2Y3                 
                                       +  1*State ownership   + 2*ln(Sales)  + ε     
   
where the dependent variable is the relative offer size of the IPO. The 
independent variables include the year over year percentage changes in EBIT 
in the three years after the IPO, defined as below: 
EBIT_0Y1 = percentage change from year 0 to year 1 
EBIT_1Y2 =  percentage change from year 1 to year 2 
EBIT_2Y3 = percentage change from year 2 to year 3 
 
The control variables include state ownership and sales. State ownership is 
the percentage owned by the state government after the IPO. Sales is the 
annual sales (measured in yuan millions), in logarithm, in the IPO year. 
 
Operating Performance 
We measure the operating performance using three accounting measures: sales, net profit, and 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). Panel A presents the means and medians from three years prior 
to and three years after the IPO. As can be seen from the medians, annual sales increase steadily, even 
after the IPO. Net profit and EBIT, on the other hand, seem to have peaked at the time of the IPO, and 
declined afterwards.  
The results show that relative offer size is negatively associated with sales, a proxy for 
firm size. This result implies that large firms have relatively lower offer size. State 
ownership prior to the IPO only marginally affects relative offer size, and the effect, if 
any, is negative.  
 
More importantly, the coefficients of EBIT_0Y1 and EBIT_1Y2 are positive and 
significant statistically. The results suggest that IPO firms sell more shares relative to 
their assets when the EBIT growth is higher in each of the two years after the IPO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
In this study we establish a theoretical model of new equity issues under 
asymmetric information. We discuss the implications on a firm’s IPO size at 
the time of its IPO. The model’s predictions are tested using a sample of newly 
listed Chinese firms. The results provide strong support for our model. 
Specifically, the IPO size is positively correlated with short-term earnings. 
Regression Model 
Panel A: Operating Performance from Year -3 to Year +3 
Year -3 Year -2 Year -1 Year 0 Year +1 Year +2 Year +3 
Sales N 1443 1490 1266 1542 1430 1368 1359 
Mean 1348.1 1633.3 1990.1 2609.5 1617.8 1443.8 1778.1 
Median 211.0 261.0 316.0 366.5 411.0 461.0 528.0 
Net Profit N 1428 1475 1253 1391 1391 1367 1359 
Mean 221.5 268.4 326.8 446.7 217.5 106.8 132.3 
Median 22.0 29.0 35.0 46.0 48.0 44.0 44.0 
EBIT N 1443 1487 1264 1542 1430 1368 1359 
Mean 299.0 393.3 458.4 570.2 319.8 150.0 170.5 
Median 29.0 36.0 44.0 56.0 60.0 54.0 53.0 
Panel B: Year to Year Percentage Changes from Year-3 to Year +3 
(-3, -2) (-2, -1) (-1,0) (0, +1) (+1, +2) (+2, +3) 
 
Sales 
N 1441 1238 1246 1416 1362 1354 
Mean 67.8% 37.6% 27.3% 28.2% 22.3% 23.6% 
Median 22.5% 18.7% 15.4% 16.1% 14.2% 14.4% 
 
Net Profit 
N 1426 1226 1145 1262 1277 1259 
Mean 93.4% 50.7% 35.0% -5.1% -42.7% 96.6% 
Median 24.3% 18.8% 24.0% 9.6% 1.8% 3.1% 
 
EBIT 
N 1439 1234 1246 1412 1316 1262 
Mean 97.8% 46.4% 56.5% 60.8% -17.8% 51.0% 
Median 23.9% 18.0% 20.2% 10.7% 1.1% 3.0% 
 
Year 
 
N 
Offer price 
(yuan) 
First-day 
return 
Offer size 
(yuan million) 
Number of 
employees 
State ownership 
before IPO 
State 
ownership 
after IPO 
1992 40 25.9 487.0% 594.5 3,672 21.7% 36.6% 
1993 129 13.1 380.7% 273.1 3,005 46.5% 42.2% 
1994 106 5.2 158.8% 154.0 2,997 54.5% 38.8% 
1995 28 3.9 542.7% 200.4 3,933 49.2% 35.9% 
1996 206 5.2 333.3% 130.9 2,248 49.4% 36.7% 
1997 209 6.1 265.8% 323.3 2,652 65.2% 45.5% 
1998 104 6.2 292.9% 383.8 3,432 76.0% 54.0% 
1999 97 6.3 116.2% 522.1 2,969 70.2% 48.6% 
2000 133 8.0 154.7% 611.7 1,883 70.6% 47.8% 
2001 75 9.0 229.9% 764.7 9,340 68.0% 47.3% 
2002 71 7.0 148.7% 752.4 2,797 67.4% 45.0% 
2003 67 7.3 72.0% 705.1 2,002 58.6% 38.8% 
2004 100 8.5 70.1% 361.1 1,705 39.9% 26.1% 
2005 15 6.6 45.1% 384.2 2,761 41.2% 25.1% 
2006 65 8.2 84.8% 1970.5 13,242 37.3% 26.2% 
2007 126 11.5 193.1% 3878.7 14,236 27.0% 21.3% 
Overall 1,571 8.0 227.4% 747.5 4,276 55.1% 39.9% 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.693 
[8.54]*** 
0.719 
[7.91]*** 
0.719 
[7.58]*** 
0.684 
[7.14]*** 
State ownership -0.059 
l-1.48] 
-0.070 
[-1.62] 
-0.078 
[-1.72]* 
-0.049 
[-1.07] 
Ln(Sales) -0.052 
[-3.85]*** 
-0.053 
[3.45]*** 
-0.052 
[-3.24]*** 
-0.053 
[-3.27]*** 
EBIT_0Y1 0.008 
[1.82]* 
0.011 
[2.29]** 
EBIT_1Y2 
0.017 
[3.31]*** 
0.073 
[6.00]*** 
EBIT_2Y3 
0.000 
[-0.45] 
0.000 
[-0.25] 
Adj. R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 
F-value 7.83 9.47 5.50 10.92 
Regression Results 
